The widely accepted forecast is that
the global demand for oil will increase at a steady rate
from the current 82 million barrels per day (mbpd) to 120
mbpd in 2030. On the supply side, the major assumption has
been that the key producers of the Persian Gulf region will
meet most of the growth in future oil demand. Yet, a majority
of these countries face stringent self-imposed restrictions
on their ability to invite foreign companies to assist them
in developing their hydrocarbon resources.
These restrictive policies, of course,
are not limited to the Middle East or to OPEC countries.
Mexico, for instance, remains firmly closed to foreign equity
interests in its upstream oil sector. In addition, some
of these producers are or have been for sometime subjected
to vigorous economic sanctions by the United States or even
by the United Nations. As a result, there has been no significant
foreign investment in the Persian Gulf region’s oil
and natural gas exploration and production for almost three
decades.
Looking over the horizon, it becomes
more and more apparent that there will be a serious supply/demand
imbalance within the next two decades. Indonesia and Malaysia,
Southeast Asia’s largest oil exporters, are expected
to become net oil importers before 2010. In Latin America,
Venezuela and Mexico may need several years before they
have the will and the means to increase oil production and
additional delivery capacity. In West Africa, oil companies
are only focusing on offshore due to the constant struggle
to do business onshore. Nigeria specifically has to grapple
with internal strife, with a fairly polarized rivalry between
the North and the South, which will not go away soon. Finally,
the hopes of exporting oil from the Caspian Sea region became
mired in the politics of running pipelines through regions
where the national interests of U.S. and other major players
are often at odds with each other.
Over the past decade, however,
for various economic and political reasons Iran, Iraq, Kuwait
and Saudi Arabia, have been actively searching for mechanisms
to facilitate foreign investment in their upstream oil sector.
These four countries, collectively, possess over 53% of
the world’s proven oil reserves, currently provide
23% of the world’s oil production and are expected
to supply 31% of the global oil requirement by 2020.
We are now at a turning point. Despite
widespread rhetoric of how diverse oil supplies are at the
present time, the Middle East is still the “oil king”
destined to play a much larger role on the world stage of
energy. Meanwhile, the strategic choice that these resource-rich
countries have to make involves the inclusion of foreign
oil companies for capital, managerial capabilities, and
cutting-edge technology to meet the world’s future
energy demands as well as socio-economic and political expectations
of their own increasingly youthful population.
This
newly updated, 240 plus page, in-depth report is the result
of an ongoing independent investigation and analyses of
the thought processes, views, and actions of the original
members of OPEC in the Persian Gulf region that International
Petroleum Enterprises (IPE) has been focusing on since September
2001 regarding reopening of upstream oil and natural gas
to foreign interests. The report discusses the oil
and natural gas situation in Iran, Iraq, Kuwait and Saudi
Arabia and their respective experience with the concept
of reopening; aspirations and requirements of the international
oil companies (IOCs) related to opportunities in the region;
risks; and a realistic outlook. Particular emphasis has
been placed on two innovative, yet controversial, concepts
that have attracted considerable attention worldwide for
almost a decade: “buyback” and “Project
Kuwait.” Access to relevant information selected from
various sources and carefully evaluated such as those contained
in this report is an essential prerequisite for a comprehensive
understanding of the global energy industry.
| |
| Executive Summary |
| |
PART I |
| World Oil and Natural Gas: Overview
& Trends |
Projected Energy Trends |
Demand |
| Supply |
| Forgotten Issues |
| The “Call” on the
Restricted Countries |
| Key Persian Gulf Producers |
| Prospects for Higher Output
in the Persian Gulf Region
|
| Analytical
Inattention to Oil Production |
| Issues
Common to OPEC Countries |
| Alternatives Confronting the Restricted
Countries |
| Reliance on National Resources |
| Inclusion of IOCs |
| Importance
of Rate of Return |
| Competition
for Capital |
| Importance
of Fiscal Terms |
| Technical
Aspects of Contractual Models |
| Potential Impact of IOC
Investment |
| IOC
Impact on Production Levels |
IOC
Impact on Market Management |
| |
PART II |
| Iran’s Petroleum Industry |
| Post-Nationalization Era |
| Constitutional Constraints
on Foreign Investment |
| New Energy Policy |
| Buyback Contracts |
| The
First Implemented Buyback Contract |
| The
1995 Buyback Tender |
| The
1998 Buyback Tender |
| The
“Discounted” Buyback |
| Azadegan
Agreement |
| Amended
Buyback Terms |
| Stalled
Buyback Projects |
| Buyback Approach: Evaluation
and Outlook |
| Iranian
Interests |
| IOC
Interests |
| Impact
on Iran’s Energy Strategy |
| Domestic
Political Opposition |
| Contractual
Issues |
| Energy Strategy |
| EPC Contracts |
| Projects
Restricted to EPC Contracts |
Projects
Open to Buybacks or EPCs |
| Caspian Sea Projects |
| Production Sharing Agreements |
| |
PART III |
| Iraq’s Petroleum Industry |
| The 1958 Revolution |
| The Saddam Era |
| Oil Policy Changes |
| Iraq’s Post-War
Offer: February 1990 |
| Iraq’s
Contractual Approach: September
1991 |
| Contract Negotiations:
May 1991 to July 2000 |
| Iraq’s New Approach:
July 2000 |
| Other Approaches |
| Impact of U.N. Sanctions |
| The “Oil-For-Food”
Program |
| Oil Smuggling |
| Possible Exemption for
Upstream Oil Investment |
| Post-Persian Gulf War
Iraq |
| The Social Divide |
| Changing of the Guards |
| The Regime Change |
| Post-U.N. Sanctions |
| Transition Era |
| Economic Perspectives |
| Federalist Model |
| Iraq's Petroleum Industry Perspectives |
| |
PART IV |
| Kuwait’s Petroleum Industry
|
| Offshore Development |
| Kuwaiti Concerns |
| Security
|
| Required
Technology |
| Natural
Gas Shortage |
| Economic
and Social Issues |
| New Energy Policy |
| Project Kuwait |
| Kuwait’s Contractual
Model: OSA |
| Kuwaiti
Interests |
| IOC
Interests |
| Implementation of Project
Kuwait |
| Progress
with IOCs |
| Opposition
in the National Assembly |
| Future Outlook |
| |
PART V |
| Saudi Arabia’s Petroleum
Industry |
| Neutral Zone |
| Plan to Maintain Sustainable
Spare Capacity |
| Saudi Oil Wealth |
| New Oil Policy - Clarity and Separation
of Roles |
| Saudi Gas Initiative |
| Core
Venture No. 1 (Ghawar
Project) |
| Core
Venture No. 2 (Red Sea
Project) |
| Core
Venture No. 3 (Shaybah
Project) |
| Production |
| Water
Desalination |
| Electricity
Generation |
| Petrochemicals |
| Summary
of Negotiations |
| Redesigning and Relaunching
of the SGI |
| Royal Succession |
Short-Term
Outlook |
| Post-Fahd Era |
| |
PART VI |
| Conclusion |
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